Morality without bribes and threats: Why humanists reject the idea of a reward-and-punishment God — and what this means for our understanding of ethics

By Air Marshall Vir Narain (Retd.)

Vir Narain, formerly Air Officer Commander-in-Chief, Indian Air Force Training Command, is currently Chairman of the Indian Humanist Union, which his father, Narsingh Narain (1898-1972), founded in 1960.

In this thought-provoking article, he argues that humanism must reject the “reward and punishment” (rap) basis for morality in favour of intrinsic, reason-based ethics.

Since words are the only weapons with which the battles of ideas can be fought, those who are fighting for a new idea invariably start off with a disadvantage: their opponents are better armed with a well-established vocabulary strengthened by usage, custom and historical associations. New words may have to be coined, or old ones assigned a slightly different meaning, to express a new idea clearly. The survival and growth of a new word-idea combination depends almost as much upon the acceptability of the word as on the strength of the new idea. T H Huxley’s ‘agnosticism’ (1869) and George Holyoake’s ‘secularism’ (1846) represent two successful innovations that have had a great influence on the development of humanist thought.

​In the humanist discourse on morality, however, there still seems to be a need to develop an adequate vocabulary. Narsingh Narain said:  

“We have to take note of two categories of good social behaviour, one being that which is motivated by hope of gain or approbation, or fear of loss or disapprobation... and the other on a sense of values inherent in human nature and requiring no external sanction. The latter alone deserves to be called ‘moral’, I do not know any name for the former but will call it ‘lawabiding’ ...  It is basic to our position that morality and lawabidingness should be clearly distinguished and disentangled from each other.”

​However, it does not seem appropriate to characterise behaviour based on hope of reward or fear of punishment as ‘lawabidingness’.  A person can (and most people do) adhere to the law because they consider it the right thing to do, and not out of fear of punishment – and the question of earning rewards for adhering to the law does not even seem to arise. In fact, it can be argued that lawful and unlawful behaviour belongs to a different (though not entirely separate) domain from moral behaviour. Perhaps the most suitable word to describe good behaviour based on hope of reward or fear of punishment is ‘Godfearing’ morality; except that in current usage (and in dictionaries) it is generally used as a term of approbation. A Godfearing man is meant to be a virtuous man. ‘Rap’ (reward-and-punishment) morality is clearer, and has no such flattering associations. Also, we should note the fact that the existing word ‘rap’ reinforces the intended meaning. 

​The concept of ‘rap’ morality leads to its source: a rewarding and punishing God.  When Einstein said “The main source of the present-day conflicts between the spheres of religion and science lies in the concept of a personal God” he most probably meant a rewarding and punishing God. Others have used the terms ‘anthropomorphic God’ and ‘interventionist God’.  The term ‘rap God’ is more direct and explicit, and establishes an immediate connection with rap morality. Within the humanist movement there has always been a certain amount of difficulty in evolving a common approach to the various ideas covered by words like atheism, non-theism and agnosticism. New words, such as apatheism and irrelevantheism, have also been suggested. Atheists mostly reject all concepts of God  (including those suggested by Spinoza and Einstein). Presumably, non-theists ignore the question of the existence or non-existence of God; and agnostics declare that they do not (or cannot) know. A pragmatic humanist position in this matter would be that the humanist movement, as such, ignores the various claims about the existence of God as having no relevance to the practical conduct of human affairs, except that it categorically rejects the idea of a rewarding and punishing God who intervenes in human affairs. In other words: humanism is not concerned with the God of the philosophers; and rejects the God of the moralists. There should be no difficulty in achieving near-unanimity among humanists on this formulation.  

​The Humanist Minimum Statement could then be recast thus: “Humanism is a democratic and ethical life stance, which affirms that human beings have the right and responsibility to give meaning and shape to their own lives.  It stands for the building of a more humane society through an ethic based on human and other natural values in the spirit of reason and free enquiry through human capabilities.  It is not theistic, in the sense that it ignores the various claims about the existence of God as having no relevance to the practical conduct of human affairs, except that it categorically rejects the idea of a rewarding and punishing God who intervenes in human affairs.  It does not accept a supernatural view of reality.” (Variations emphasised)

​In Spring 1966, a Manifesto adopted by the Indian Humanist Union (article 5) stated: “Belief in an anthropomorphic God, who listens to prayers, grants boons and gives rewards and punishments; and belief in revelation, prophets and incarnations are inconsistent with the Humanist outlook. Theism not accompanied by such beliefs, as well as atheism and agnosticism, are consistent with Humanism.”

​By giving a name to the type of God, and the type of morality, we reject we will make the task of clarifying the basic Humanist position to the followers of traditional religions a little easier.

https://allduniv.academia.edu/VirNarain