From population bomb to baby bust: should governments encourage parenthood?

By Sophy Robinson

Many humanists welcome falling birth rates as a positive response to environmental pressures. Yet governments across the developed world are increasingly alarmed by ageing populations and shrinking workforces. Sophy Robinson examines the rise of modern pronatalism and asks whether encouraging people to have more children is either desirable or morally justified.

Sophy is a former trustee of Humanists UK.

The global replacement rate – the average number of children per woman required to maintain a stable population without immigration – is approximately 2.1. Yet most developed countries now sit well below that threshold. The problem is most pronounced in East Asia, where fertility rates in Japan, South Korea and neighbouring countries are all below 1.3. Japan's rate has hovered around 1.2–1.3 for years. China, despite its vast population, now records fewer births than at any time since the Mao era. In Europe, the average fertility rate is around 1.5, and countries from Italy to Hungary face shrinking workforces and mounting pension burdens.

Even in some emerging economies, fertility rates have fallen sharply. In Brazil, for example, the fertility rate has dropped from 6.1 in 1960 to around 1.6 today. Only countries in sub-Saharan Africa are still replacing their populations, and even there fertility rates are falling rapidly. As infant mortality has declined, the traditional model of having many children in the hope that some will become educated breadwinners and help lift their parents out of poverty is gradually disappearing.

The United Nations' latest projections suggest that by 2100, 97% of the world's countries will have fertility rates below replacement level. This points towards a demographic crisis, as fewer young people mean fewer workers, fewer taxpayers and greater pressure to support growing numbers of older citizens. Economic growth slows, labour shortages emerge, and welfare systems become increasingly difficult to finance.

Countries at war, notably Ukraine and Russia, are struggling to recruit enough fit and able soldiers to continue the conflict, feeding yet more young people into the so-called “meat grinder”. Despite the shift towards drone warfare, we read about increasingly desperate methods of conscription.

Yet we might challenge these purely utilitarian views of children. There are also powerful emotional drivers behind family life. The parental bond, and the love of a child, can be profoundly life-changing. The increasing use of IVF suggests that the desire to have children remains deeply rooted. For many people, bringing up children brings enrichment and meaning to their lives, while strong relationships with children can help keep parents young, providing new challenges and fresh perspectives as they age.

As religiosity declines in Western countries, one might have expected that the belief that there is no life after death would strengthen the desire to leave a legacy through having children. Yet the evolutionary drive to pass on our genes – an idea popularised by Richard Dawkins's “selfish gene” concept – appears to be outweighed by other social and economic factors, as reflected in continuing declines in birth rates.

Meanwhile, governments have responded with an extraordinary array of policies designed to encourage people to have more children. These range from cash bonuses and tax incentives to subsidised childcare, housing assistance, extended parental leave and even direct payments linked to marriage and childbirth. Yet many of these measures remain controversial, and their effectiveness has yet to be proven.

The rise of modern pronatalism

The modern wave of pronatalist policies began in the 1990s, as fertility rates across Europe and East Asia continued their post-war decline. Initial efforts focused on making parenthood more affordable, particularly through family allowances and tax credits.

Over time, however, policymakers realised that the barriers to having children extended beyond financial costs alone. Rising house prices, precarious employment, delayed marriage, long working hours and changing social expectations all appeared to contribute to falling birth rates. Governments increasingly adopted broader approaches aimed at creating conditions more favourable to family life.

The challenge is that fertility is shaped by deeply personal choices. While governments can reduce costs and provide support, they cannot compel people to become parents. As humanists, we value freedom over coercion and believe people should be free to choose whether, and when, to have children. We might also question whether population decline is necessarily a catastrophe, given that AI may reduce the demand for labour, while smaller populations could ease environmental pressures and improve sustainability.

The debate is not merely economic: it touches on fundamental issues of freedom, social responsibility, gender equality and the relationship between citizens and the state. Should governments seek to influence such intimate decisions at all? The following examples illustrate some of the policies that have been introduced, and provide a context for considering these questions.

Hungary: Europe’s most ambitious experiment

Perhaps no developed country has embraced pronatalism more enthusiastically than Hungary under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. Since 2010, Hungary has introduced a wide-ranging package of family support policies. Married couples can access subsidised loans, with portions forgiven when children are born. Families with multiple children receive substantial housing subsidies, while mothers with four or more children are exempt from income tax for life. Large families can also receive assistance with purchasing vehicles, and grandparents may take paid childcare leave. Orbán explicitly framed these policies as an alternative to immigration. Rather than offsetting population decline through inward migration, his government argued that Hungary should increase its native-born population.

The scale of spending has been remarkable. Hungary devotes a larger share of its national income to family benefits than almost any other OECD country. The fertility rate has risen modestly from the extremely low levels recorded in the early 2010s but remains well below replacement level. Critics argue that many of the benefits disproportionately favour middle-class and affluent families who were already likely to have children, while supporters maintain that demographic change requires long-term commitment.

Japan: supporting families in an ageing society

Japan has served as a warning case of demographic decline for decades. Its population exemplifies the inverted population pyramid, with nearly a third of its citizens now aged 65 or over – the highest proportion in the world. With one of the world's highest life expectancies and lowest fertility rates, the nation now faces a potential support ratio (PSR) of less than 1.8 – the number of people aged 15–64 for every person aged 65 or over. This is the lowest ratio in the world, underscoring the economic and social strains of rapid ageing.

Entire rural communities have seen schools close and local services disappear as younger generations migrate to cities and have fewer children. There is also mounting pressure on Japan's pension and healthcare systems, which rely on a robust workforce to sustain them. By 2040, the country may face a shortfall of up to 11 million workers, posing serious risks to economic growth and fiscal stability.

Japanese governments have responded with an evolving series of family support programmes. Beginning in the 1990s, policymakers expanded childcare provision and parental leave. More recently, attention has focused on reducing the financial burden of raising children.

Measures introduced during the 2020s include expanded child allowances, free preschool education, increased childcare capacity and efforts to improve work–life balance. Meanwhile, a Long-Term Care Insurance system has been introduced to help older people “maintain dignity and an independent daily life according to each person's abilities”. However, the cost of the scheme had risen to around $100 billion by 2025, far above the original projection of $30 billion.

Yet Japan illustrates the limits of policy intervention. Despite decades of pronatalist efforts, fertility remains stubbornly low, and it is forecast that by 2070 the population will have fallen from around 120 million to 90 million. Many young adults cite economic insecurity, expensive housing, demanding careers and changing attitudes towards marriage as reasons for delaying parenthood or avoiding it altogether.

South Korea: throwing money at the problem

South Korea's demographic situation is even more dramatic. It now has one of the lowest fertility rates ever recorded in a modern society. Since the early 2000s, successive governments have spent hundreds of billions of dollars on programmes intended to boost births. These have included baby bonuses, childcare subsidies, parental leave benefits, fertility treatment support, housing assistance and educational subsidies. Local governments have sometimes competed to offer particularly generous incentives, with new parents in some regions receiving substantial cash payments spread over several years.

Despite this investment, the fertility rate continued to decline throughout much of the period. Analysts point to structural factors that financial incentives alone cannot address. South Korea's highly competitive education system, expensive housing market, gender inequality in domestic labour and intense workplace culture all discourage people from having children. The South Korean experience has become a cautionary tale for policymakers elsewhere: generous spending does not necessarily translate into more babies.

China: from one child to three

China's demographic challenge is unique because it is partly the result of deliberate government policy. The one-child policy, introduced in 1979, dramatically reduced fertility over subsequent decades. By the 2010s, however, Chinese leaders had become increasingly concerned about population ageing and workforce decline. The government first relaxed the one-child policy, then introduced a two-child policy in 2016 and eventually a three-child policy in 2021.

Alongside these changes, the government has encouraged local authorities to provide financial incentives, housing assistance, tax benefits, expanded childcare services, and longer parental leave. Some cities now offer cash payments for additional children and free fertility treatment. Yet the legacy of decades of low fertility has proved difficult to reverse. Many urban Chinese couples face high housing costs, expensive education, demanding work schedules and uncertainty about future economic prospects. Birth rates have continued to fall despite the removal of previous restrictions.

China's experience highlights an important lesson: preventing births may be easier than encouraging them once social norms have changed.

What comes next?

Governments continue to experiment. Proposals under discussion around the world include expanded universal childcare, heavily subsidised housing for young families, student debt relief linked to parenthood, publicly funded fertility treatment and more generous parental leave schemes.

Some commentators have suggested even more radical measures, including direct annual payments to parents, tax systems weighted heavily in favour of larger families and government-sponsored programmes to help young adults find long-term partners. In countries facing severe population decline, policymakers are increasingly asking whether demographic objectives should influence urban planning, employment policy and welfare design.

What is clear is that the demographic transition confronting many developed societies is unprecedented. Governments from Budapest to Beijing, and Tokyo to Seoul, are searching for solutions. Yet no country has discovered a reliable formula for returning to replacement-level fertility. The lesson of the past three decades may be that while governments can make parenthood easier, they cannot simply engineer a baby boom.

The demographic challenge has brought pronatalism back into mainstream politics. Whether these policies ultimately succeed – or whether societies instead adapt to a future of lower fertility and older populations – will be one of the defining social questions of the twenty-first century.

Humanists have traditionally championed reproductive freedom and often welcomed falling birth rates as a natural consequence of education, development and female empowerment. Yet should governments seek to influence one of the most intimate decisions we ever make? Or should the decision to become a parent remain entirely a matter of individual choice?

Further reading

• John Kampfner, Braver New World: The Countries Daring to Do Things Others Won’t (Atlantic Books, 2026). An exploration of how different countries are tackling major social and economic challenges, including demographic change.

• Institute for Economics & Peace, After the Peak: Challenges of a Shrinking World. Vision of Humanity article

Continue the discussion

Why not discuss this dilemma at your next Humanist group meeting? Discussion prompts could include:

1. Should governments try to influence people's decisions about whether to have children, or should parenthood remain entirely a matter of personal choice?

2. Should declining birth rates concern us, or might smaller populations ultimately benefit humanity and the planet?

3. If governments do encourage parenthood, what forms of support are legitimate? Where should the line be drawn?

4. What values should guide humanists when thinking about population, family life and the future of society?