Balance and resistance: two political orientations within humanism
By Ralf Schöppner
When should humanists seek dialogue and compromise, and when must they resist? Drawing on Germany’s political history and contemporary challenges, philosopher Ralf Schöppner argues that balance, pluralism and openness are essential humanist virtues, but not without limits. This article, adapted from his address at the World Humanist Congress in Ottawa, explores when to build bridges and when to draw boundaries.
Professor Dr Ralf Schöppner is a German philosopher and Professor of the Theory and History of Humanism at the Humanistische Hochschule Berlin, where he also serves as Rector for Teaching. He is President of the Humanist Academy of Berlin-Brandenburg.
I would like to distinguish between two political orientations within humanism: balance and resistance. My central thesis is this: Given the political situation in many parts of the world today, resistance is often the appropriate political response. At the same time, however, we should not lose sight of the fact that humanism, by its very nature, points us toward a different primary orientation: balance – understood not as neutrality or indecision, but as a commitment to dialogue, mediation and finding common ground across differences. It is this balancing disposition within humanism that has the potential to win people over to democracy, human rights, human dignity, ecological transformation, and peace.
I would like to develop this argument in three stages: Humanism as balance; the capacities required for a balanced orientation; and the limits of humanism as balance.
Humanism as balance
Balance means not simply taking sides in difficult, polarised debates, but trying to be a moderating and mediating voice (building bridges); being able to transfer one's own perspective within a pluralistic debate in order to find solutions that work well for everyone; and not expecting everyone else to live according to our own idea of what a good life should be.
There are three reasons why I regard balance as the primary political orientation of humanism:
Humanists encounter people with different convictions. Many humanists live in diverse societies. We constantly encounter people who do not identify as humanists. We meet religious people – many of them are democrats. We meet people with different opinions about the relation of freedom and community. And, of course, there are significant differences among humanists themselves.
Political conflicts are often complex. On many politically significant questions, humanism cannot take only one side of the conflict. I dare to give one very controversial example: It is not sufficient to be in solidarity only with Palestine. And it is not sufficient to be in solidarity only with Israel. We should be in solidarity with both peoples. Humanism should not contribute to polarisation. It should cultivate an ethos that embraces complexity. It should resist simple, reassuring answers. And it should resist simplistic either-or thinking.
Humanism has a dual and open identity. In many parts of the world, humanists represent the interests of non-religious people, which is only a part of humanity. At the same time, however, humanism cannot be reduced to a form of identity politics or lobbying on behalf of the non-religious alone. By its very nature, humanism addresses humanity as a whole. It makes a universal claim and therefore it seeks to promote the peaceful and flourishing coexistence of everyone – the common good. This double identity requires a balancing orientation.
The capacities required for a balanced orientation
A balanced humanist orientation requires several intellectual, moral, emotional and social capacities. I would like to highlight just four of them. The first is the ability to distinguish between the good and the just.
The good: Humanism offers a comprehensive conception of a good human life, encompassing how we wish to live both privately and publicly.
The just: Humanism also embraces political and moral principles that we regard as universally binding: human rights, democracy, the separation of religion and state, and the pursuit of social justice.
Humanism, understood as a comprehensive vision of the good life, extends beyond these universal obligations. It also embraces everything that humanists regard as true, good and beautiful – values we may advocate but should not impose on everyone as moral duties. For example, we expect everyone to respect freedom of religion and belief. But we do not expect everyone to lead a life without religion, even though we ourselves may regard such a life as preferable, or more authentic.
A second capacity is the ability to take oneself seriously – but not too seriously. Time and again, I see people in public debates defending their opinions as if everything depended on them – as though their identity, happiness or even self-worth were at stake. When that happens, they lose the ability to see themselves in perspective. They stop listening carefully, become unwilling to engage seriously with other viewpoints, and lose the capacity to laugh at themselves. Of course, I take my own views seriously. But not that seriously!
A third capacity is the willingness to defend an inclusive public debate on difficult and controversial issues. A balancing orientation means taking other and minority perspectives seriously instead of simply brushing them aside. This kind of inclusive public sphere strengthens democratic legitimacy.
A fourth capacity is the ability to suspend judgement from time to time. Today we live in an age of opinion overload. Many people seem to have an immediate opinion about almost everything.
Opinions are expressed with remarkable certainty, whether anyone has asked for them or not.
This inflation of opinion contributes to the division of societies. Perhaps we should occasionally go on an “opinion diet” or “opinion detox”. It can be surprisingly refreshing to take part in a discussion without immediately offering your own opinion. When someone expresses an opinion with complete certainty, ask – politely – “How did you arrive at that conclusion?” “How did you form it?” “Have you really worked to form it?” Having an opinion is not particularly difficult. What is difficult is to form a well-considered opinion, to examine it critically, and to refine it through conversation with others.
Let me be clear. A balancing orientation is not the same as neutrality. Nor does it imply a lack of conviction. One can express one's own perspectives in a balanced way. Nor does balance mean tolerating everything. Balance, like tolerance, has its limits. No tolerance for intolerance.
The limits of humanism as balance
Let me take you back to 30 April 1928. Back to Joseph Goebbels, a member of the National Socialist German Workers' Party, who would later become the Nazi regime's Minister of Propaganda. On that day, he wrote: “We are entering the Reichstag in order to arm ourselves with democracy's own weapons from its arsenal. [...] If democracy is foolish enough to provide us with free passes and privileges for this purpose, that is its own affair.” Just three weeks later, on 20 May, Goebbels entered the Reichstag as a democratically elected member of parliament. The National Socialists used democratic institutions to destroy democracy itself. Before that happened, many political actors believed that the Nazis could be moderated through compromise and balance. They were wrong.
If we look at Europe today, we can see why this history still matters. In many countries, right-wing populist and far-right parties are represented in parliament. In some countries, they are already part of government. In this context, balance is not enough. Resistance becomes necessary.
The example above comes from Germany. But many of you will be able to think of comparable examples from your own countries and regions. Fascism, authoritarianism, religious fundamentalism, and aggressive militarism cannot be overcome through dialogue, compromise or reconciliation alone.
In such cases, humanism requires demarcation and resistance.
In many places today, there are actors who pursue openly anti-humanist agendas and have no interest in compromise. They can only be confronted through resistance. What this resistance looks like will differ from one country to another. The challenges faced by a Nigerian human-rights activist or an Iranian feminist are very different from those currently faced by European humanists.
How should humanists respond to right-wing populist and far-right parties?
For the remainder of my remarks, I will focus on a question that is particularly relevant to me as a European humanist living in Berlin: How should humanists respond to right-wing populist and far-right parties – and to those who vote for them? When is resistance required? And when is balance the better path?
Maybe it will help to distinguish between political opponents and political enemies of humanism. Committed far-right extremists, fascists and religious fundamentalists are political enemies of humanism. Whether they appear as parties, organisations, politicians, or citizens, humanists must take a clear and united stand against them – resistance. Legal measures – including party bans – may deserve serious consideration. Civil disobedience could be necessary and justified.
Political opponents are a different matter. Normally, they operate within a shared commitment to democracy and human rights. Conservative, religious or libertarian actors often fall into this category. On some issues they may oppose humanist positions; on others they may not.
The boundary between opponents and enemies is not always easy to draw. What matters, however, is that political opposition is a normal and necessary feature of democratic life. When democracy and human rights are at stake, humanists should be able to seek for common ground with political opponents, who could be allies.
In Germany, much attention is currently devoted to the idea of a political “firewall”. It means to prevent far-right and populist parties from entering government. To achieve this goal, humanists should be willing to cooperate with democratic opponents when necessary. At the same time, many far-right voters and sympathisers are neither hardened extremists nor committed enemies of democracy. Many are politically inconsistent. Some are disappointed. Others have unreflective or just different opinions on democracy. Toward such people, resistance is often the wrong response.
Humanists should rely here on the strengths of a balancing orientation: openness, dialogue, differentiation, and a willingness to engage. These are among the qualities that make humanism attractive and persuasive.
“... let us not forget that there are also dogmatists within humanism.”
What matters is the honest struggle for hearts and minds. Whether anti-democratic movements grow stronger or weaker depends, in no small measure, on whether that struggle succeeds. And let us not forget that there are also dogmatists within humanism. They exist. They regard the balancing orientation of humanism with suspicion. They point to current political developments saying that balance is wrong in principle. To them I would say this: Balance remains the primary political orientation of humanism, even though it has limits. The challenge for humanists is to decide which orientation is appropriate in which circumstances.
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